Risk Constrained Trading Strategies for Stochastic Generation with a
  Single-Price Balancing Market by Browell, Jethro
ar
X
iv
:1
70
8.
02
62
5v
1 
 [q
-fi
n.G
N]
  2
3 J
un
 20
17
1
Risk Constrained Trading Strategies for Stochastic
Generation with a Single-Price Balancing Market
Jethro Browell
Abstract—Due to the limited predictability of wind power
and other stochastic generation, trading this energy in com-
petitive electricity markets is challenging. This paper derives
revenue-maximising and risk-constrained strategies for stochastic
generators participating in electricity markets with a single-
price balancing mechanism. Starting from the optimal—and
impractical—strategy of offering zero or nominal power, which
exposes the participant to potentially large imbalance costs, we
develop a number of strategies that control risk by hedging
against penalising balancing prices in favour of rewarding ones.
Trading strategies are formulated in a probabilistic framework in
order to address asymmetry in balancing prices. The large-scale
communication of system information characteristic of modern
power systems is utilised to inputs for electricity price forecasts
and probabilistic system length forecasts. A case study using data
from the GB market in the UK is presented and the ability of
the proposed strategies to increase revenue and reduce risk is
demonstrated and analysed.
Index Terms—Energy Trading, Risk, Electricity Markets,
Stochastic Generation
I. INTRODUCTION
ELECTRICITY markets were designed for dispatchablegeneration. Since energy liberalisation in Europe, the
US, and elsewhere, supply and demand have been matched
by centralised operation of transmission systems using a
combination of connected markets for energy and ancillary
services [1]. Stochastic generators, such as wind and solar,
require power production forecasts to participate economically
in these markets, and while high-quality forecasts are widely
available and improving, they will never be perfect.
Much attention has been given to how stochastic generation
can be integrated into electricity markets [2]. Strategies for
their participation can benefit from use of information about
forecast uncertainty in order to deal with asymmetric penalties
for over- or under-producing. Most of this work has focused
on wind since this technology is more established, but the
principals are transferable to other stochastic generators, such
as solar, or other smart grid actors such as aggregators [3].
Looking towards the future, new electricity market arrange-
ments which facilitate the active participation of renewables
in balancing markets are becoming a reality [4], and market
designs that incorporate directly properties of stochastic gener-
ation by allowing probabilistic offers have been proposed [5].
Offer strategies for trading wind power in day-ahead mar-
kets are derived in [6], and for dual-price balancing markets
the optimal quantile of a predictive distribution can be cal-
culated based on forecasts of imbalance prices [7], [8]. This
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analysis has been extended in [9] to include a recourse offer
closer to the time of delivery. Participation in an intraday
power exchange (which facilitates anonymous bilateral trad-
ing) is considered in [10] by accepting available bids and offers
which are deemed improve the participant’s market position,
though without a sophisticated offer strategy for the day-ahead
market. The strategic behaviour of wind power as a price-
maker has also been studied [11], [12].
Much of this work has been presented from the perspective
of the power forecaster; however, participants in electricity
markets also require price forecast to inform their decision
making, as the examples given above acknowledge. Electric
utilities forecast prices from hours to months ahead in or-
der to reduce risk or maximise profits, with day-ahead and
intraday forecasts critical for effective bidding strategies [1].
An extensive review of electricity price forecasting can be
found in [13] and results of the price forecasting track of
the 2014 Global Energy Forecasting Competition in [14] give
an overview of state-of-the-art practices. Electricity prices are
driven fundamentally by supply and demand costs, and as such
it is necessary to model these when making predictions [15],
[16], [17]. Much attention has been given to short-term elec-
tricity prices, with familiar time-series models (ARX, ARIMA,
etc) being popular. Forecasting balancing prices has received
less attention but is considered in [18] and balancing volumes
in [19], who use approaches based on ARIMA and exponential
smoothing, respectively.
While a great deal has be learned about how stochastic
generators can participate in electricity markets the majority of
this work has focused on markets a with dual-price balancing
mechanism. This is largely due to the high penetration of
renewables in these markets, particularly in Europe. While
the majority of electricity markets in Europe operate dual-
pricing systems, single-price markets dominate in the US and
are operated in Germany, the Netherlands and, since November
2015, the UK.
Large volumes of system data that are collected and shared
in smart grids to enable efficient use of available assets
and resources [20]. This data may also be utilised in the
strategies of electricity market participants. Furthermore, since
this information is available to participants electronically it can
easily be incorporated into automated trading systems.
In this work, participation of stochastic generation in a day-
ahead energy market coupled with a single-price balancing
balancing market is considered. It is observed that in this
situation, electricity market forecasts are of primary impor-
tance and that power forecasts are required only to apply
risk-constraints. A secondary result is the observation of weak
incentives for variable generation to provide accurate forecasts
2in this scenario, as also observed in [21]. Strategies based on
taking a long or short position in order to manage asymmetric
imbalance costs are proposed. Probabilistic forecasts of system
length (sign of the net system imbalance) are required in addi-
tion to forecasts of day-ahead and balancing prices. Revenue
maximisation and risk-constrained strategies are both derived,
with only the latter requiring forecasts of power production.
An introduction to day-ahead and balancing markets is
offered in Section II followed by the formulation of the
offer strategy problem and possible solutions in Section III.
Probabilistic system length forecasts using logistic regression,
and Price forecast using ARMAX models, both of which
utilise wider system data, are described in IV. A case study
using real data form the UK is presented in Section V.
Forecast performance is compared to standard benchmarks
and quantified in monetary terms based on the performance
of trading strategies. Finally, concluding remarks are made in
Section VI.
II. DAY-AHEAD AND BALANCING MARKETS
Market structures can vary widely between regions but
are typically made up of four main components: bi-lateral
contracting between individual parties from days to years
ahead of delivery, a day-ahead auction that determines the
schedule for the activation of generators and large industrial
consumers for the following day, an intraday market which
allows participants to modify their position closer to delivery,
and a balancing market utilised by the transmission system
operator to balance supply and demand in real time [22].
Additional markets may also exist for ancillary services such
as frequency response, reserve power and provision of reactive
power, and financial products such as energy options and
futures.
The most important markets for stochastic generators are the
day-ahead and the balancing markets since the need to forecast
generation makes trading further in advance impractical and
because forecast errors result in imbalances. Intraday markets
enable participants to modify their position closer to gate
closure, but often suffer from low liquidity meaning that it is
difficult for participants to find counter-parties to trade with.
Day-ahead markets are typically double-blind auctions into
which generators and consumers submit anonymous offers to
generate and bids to consume certain volumes of energy at a
price they are willing to pay or be paid. Supply and demand
are compared and a market price is calculated for each period
of the following day. This price is applied to all accepted
bids and offers and is an important reference for intraday and
balancing markets since it gives an indication of the marginal
price of energy for a given period.
Balancing markets are used by the transmission system
operator to balance supply and demand and operate from from
gate closure to the point of delivery. The cost of balancing
incurred by the system operator is recovered through payments
by those who are out of balance. Prices are calculated based
on either a single- or dual-pricing system. All participants in a
single-price system resolve their imbalance at the same imbal-
ance price, whereas in a dual-price system participants receive
different prices depending on the sign of their imbalance.
Balancing prices represent the cost to the system operator of
increasing or decreasing net-generation, and as such depend
on whether the system has a net energy surplus or deficit.
In a single-price balancing market, whether the single price
is greater or less than the day-ahead price depend on the
system length, i.e. whether the transmission system operator
has had to increase or decrease net-energy production during
a given time period. If the system is short of energy, the
balancing price will be greater than the day-ahead price the
reflect the utilisation of more expensive or flexible generators
(or demand reduction), and the converse if the system is long.
The effect of this is to penalise market participants who are
out-of-balance in the same direction as the system, and to
reward those who are helping the system by being out-of-
balance in the opposite direction. This is different to the two-
price system where imbalances contributing to the system
imbalance are penalised, and those helping receive a neutral
reference price, which is usually similar to the day-ahead price.
The importance of system length forecasting is clear: be-
ing out-of-balance the wrong way invites a penalty, whereas
being out-of-balance the right way is profitable. However,
forecasting the system length prior to submitting offers into
the day-ahead market is challenging and, since the penalties
and rewards for a correct forecast are not systemic, warrants a
probabilistic approach. In the following section this problem
is formulated and offer strategies for the day-ahead market are
derived based on a probabilistic assessment of system length.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Here we consider day-ahead offer strategies for a participant
who is a price-taker in both day-ahead and balancing markets,
and do not consider participation in intraday markets. For each
settlement period t+k, a market participant will contract some
volume of energy ECt+k at time t. The revenue Rt+k for a
participant contracting ECt+k but generating Et+k is given by
Rt+k = π
C
t+kE
C
t+k − T
C
t+k (1)
where πCt+k is the contracted price for period t+k, and T
C
t+k is
the cost associated with the energy imbalance dt+k = E
C
t+k−
Et+k. In a single-price balancing market, each participant must
buy the volume of energy equal to their deficit, or sell the
volume equal to their surplus, at the imbalance price. The
imbalance price πSt+k is a function of the balancing actions
relating to period t+k taken by the system operator to maintain
the balance supply and demand in real time and is calculated at
the each settlement period. The imbalance cost T Ct+k is given
by
T Ct+k = π
S
t+kdt+k . (2)
It is useful to express a market participant’s revenue in terms of
the actual energy they generate and their imbalance as follows
Rt+k = π
C
t+kEt+k − Tt+k (3)
from which it is clear that in order to maximise revenue,
balancing costs
Tt+k =
(
πSt+k − π
C
t+k
)
dt+k , (4)
3should be minimised.
In order to reflect the dual-nature of the single imbalance
price, we distinguish between the price resulting from net
up- or down-regulation, which corresponds to the sign of
the system net imbalance volume (NIV). Equation (4) then
becomes
Tt+k =
{(
π+t+k − π
C
t+k
)
dt+k if NIVt+k > 0(
π−t+k − π
C
t+k
)
dt+k if NIVt+k ≤ 0
. (5)
where π+t+k > π
C
t+k is the up-regulation price, and π
−
t+k <
πCt+k is the down-regulation price. The case NIVt+k = 0 is
merged with NIVt+k < 0 for simplicity and without loss of
generality since π+t+k = π
−
t+k = π
C
t+k in that situation.
Assuming not participation in other markets or incentives to
do otherwise, the aim of the market participant is to contract
the volume of energy ECt+k that maximises revenue while
managing risk.
A. Imbalance Minimisation
First we consider the simplest strategy for risk management:
minimise exposure to imbalance charges by contracting the
forecast generation for each period in the day-ahead mar-
ket. This approach reduces exposure to penalising imbalance
prices, but also reduces exposure to rewarding prices in the
case where the sign of the participant’s imbalance is the
opposite that of the system. The bid in this case is given by
ECt+k = Eˆt+k|t , (6)
where Eˆt+k|t is a forecast of Et+k made at time t set to
minimise the mean absolute error. This strategy has the benefit
of not requiring forecasts of market prices or system length.
B. Categorical Assessment of System Length
If the system length were known at the time of contracting,
according to Equation (5), the optimal volume to contract
would be ±∞! This is of course nonsense and in violation of
the price-taker assumption since such offers would influence
the clearing price of the day-ahead market and NIV.
Any participant with sufficient power would have to con-
ciser their influence on the day-ahead price, NIV and the
marginal price of balancing actions that the system operator
would have to take, and the opinion of the market regulator.
This situation is not considered here. We therefore proceed
assuming that the capacity of the wind generators we consider
is small relative to the magnitude of the NIV, and that the
contracted volume is restricted to the range 0 ≤ ECt+k ≤ Emax,
where Emax is maximum amount of energy the wind generator
could deliver in a single settlement period.
If the sign of the NIV for period t+k is known, the optimal
bid would be simply
ECt+k =
{
0 if NIVt+k > 0
Emax if NIVt+k ≤ 0
. (7)
A deterministic forecast of the sign of the NIV is required to
implement this strategy, but no power forecast is needed. Note
also that bidding only extremes leaves the participant exposed
to potentially large losses if the sign of the NIV is forecast
incorrectly.
C. Probabilistic Assessment of System Length
As imbalance prices in periods of net up and down regu-
lation are asymmetric about πC, it is desirable to formulate
offer strategies from a probabilist perspective. Consider the
energy generated during period t+ k to be a random variable
Et+k, and the probability at time t that the system will be
short Prt(NIVt+k > 0) = φt+k|t. We include the possibility
that the NIV is exactly zero in the chance that the system is
long without consequence, so Prt(NIVt+k ≤ 0) = 1−φt+k|t.
The subscripts t+k and t+k|t are dropped in the proceeding
analysis to avoid notational clutter.
In this probabilistic framework the expectation of the im-
balance cost T is given by
T = φ
(
π+ − πC
)
d+ (1− φ)
(
π− − πC
)
d (8)
where d = EC − E. Using the expectation operator E{·}, the
optimal bid can now be calculated as
E˜C = argmin
EC
E {T } (9)
= argmin
EC
(
φ(π+ − π−) + π− − πC
)
E {d} (10)
= argmin
EC
[ (
φ(π+ − π−) + π− − πC
)
×
(
EC − E {E}
) ]
(11)
Since the optimal bid depends only on the sign of the factor
multiplying the expected imbalance, it is helpful to define the
ratio
Φ =
πC − π−
π+ − π−
(12)
and write the optimal bid as
E˜C =
{
Emax if φ < Φ
0 if φ ≥ Φ
. (13)
The ratio (12) can be interpreted as a cost/loss ratio defining
the critical probability at which is becomes economic to bid
as if the system is expected to be long or short.
As the prices πC, π+ and π− are unknown at time t they
must be forecast along with φ. Note, however, that there is no
need to forecast the level of wind generation.
D. Risk Constrained Contracted Volume
So far we have only considered revenue maximisation.
Next we consider a risk constrained approach for two main
reasons: first, the risk associated with revenue maximisation
is potentially large since imbalance prices are volatile and
the strategies investigated so far require the participant to
expose themselves to the largest imbalance possible; and
second, participants with potential market power may be able
to participate in a similar way by hedging smaller volumes,
and this should be done in an informed way.
In this section alternative strategies are considered that
restrict the size of the expected imbalance by adjusting the
offer away from the forecast generation Eˆ = E{E} in order
to hedge against penalising imbalance prices. Three options
are considered: an additive adjustment where the offer is
4equal to expected generation plus/minus some parameter, ν; a
multiplicative adjustment where the offer is equal to expected
generation multiplied by some factor, 1±η;and finally, offering
a quantiles of a probabilistic generation forecasts.
1) Additive Adjustment: In this strategy the contracted
energy for a given settlement period is the expected energy
plus/minus a fixed adjustment. In effect, the capacity is parti-
tioned into Eˆ − νEmax and 2νEmax with the latter part traded
using the probabilistic forecast of system length. The final
offer bound by 0 ≤ EC ≤ Emax. This strategy can be written
as
EC =
{
min
{
Emax, Eˆ + νEmax
}
if φ < Φ
max
{
0, Eˆ − νEmax
}
if φ ≥ Φ
. (14)
The choice of ν is a trade-off between maximising revenue
and reducing exposure to imbalance charges.
2) Multiplicative Adjustment: Here we consider a con-
tracted volume proportional to the forecast generation. This
strategy has the pleasing property that exposure to imbalance
charges increases with expected generation, and therefore
with expected revenue for a given period. Put differently,
the participant is only exposed to risk when the expected
revenue is already high, and is exposed to little risk when
expected revenue is low. The contracted volume is equal to
Eˆ± (η× 100)%, bound by zero and Emax. The strategy given
by
EC =
{
min
{
Emax, (1 + η)Eˆ
}
if φ < Φ
max
{
0, (1 − η)Eˆ
}
if φ ≥ Φ
(15)
where η ≥ 0.
E. Quantile Offer
The additive and multiplicative strategies result in an im-
balance d equal to the wind power forecast error, Eˆ − E,
plus or minus an adjustment, the aim being to increase
the likelihood that this term is either positive of negative,
depending on the values of φ and Φ. Probabilistic forecasts
provide information about uncertainty associated with forecast
errors. This information can be used to chose EC such that
the probability of d > 0 is a specific value.
The predictive distribution of E can be described by a set
of quantiles {qα, α ∈ [0, 1]} where
Pr (E < qα) = α . (16)
Writing this in terms of d and EC gives Pr
(
d < qα − E
C
)
=
α. Therefore, the contracted volume EC which results in a
probability α of d being negative is given by the quantile qα.
This strategy is written as
EC =
{
qα′ if φ < Φ
q1−α′ if φ ≥ Φ
(17)
where α′ is the probability that the realisation of d has the
desired sign.
This approach is attractive because it explicitly models the
uncertainty associated with forecast errors allowing this risk-
factor to be controlled explicitly. It is also more elegant since
it removes the need to impose bounds on offers as quantiles
are bound by [0, Emax] automatically.
IV. FORECASTING
A. Probabilistic System Length Forecast
The probability that the system is will be short, φ, is esti-
mated using a logistic regression model. This approach allows
φ to be estimated conditional on some set of explanatory
variables X, formally,
φ = Pr(NIV > 0|X) . (18)
The logistic regression model is given by
log
φ
1− φ
= β ·Xt+k (19)
where the vector β contains the model parameters to be
estimated. Solving for φ yields
φ =
1
1 + exp(−β ·Xt+k)
. (20)
Explanatory variables are chosen from the wide range of power
system and market data that are available to participants. In
this work, the parameters β are determined by maximum like-
lihood estimation using R, specifically the function glm from
the package stats. Deterministic system length forecasts are
produced using the same method but rounding φ ≥ 0.5 to 1,
and φ < 0.5 to 0.
B. Price Forecasts
For the purpose of this study, we employ the popular
ARMAX-type models for price forecasting [13]. A separate
ARMAX model is fit for each settlement period and type of
day to capture the different dependencies between price and
exogenous variables in each situation. The time index τ is
used to indicate the position of price πτ in a sequence of
prices corresponding to the settlement period and day-type.
This approach regresses the price at time on its past values at
τ −1,...,τ−p, the the model error ǫτ and exogenous variables
Xk,τ . The model is written
πτ = α0+ ǫτ +
p∑
i=1
αiπτ−i+
q∑
j=1
βjǫτ−j +
∑
k
γkXk,τ (21)
where αi are the autoregressive coefficients, βj are the moving
average coefficients, and γk are the regression coefficients for
the exogenous variables. The forecast of πτ is given by
πˆτ = α0 +
p∑
i=1
αiπτ−i +
q∑
j=1
βjǫτ−j +
∑
k
γkXk,τ . (22)
The parameters αi, βj and γk are determined by maximum
likelihood expectation and the model order (p, q) by minimis-
ing the Akike Information Criterion implemented using the R
package forecast [23].
5C. Wind Power Quantile Forecasts
Quantile forecasts for time t, qˆα,t are given by the function,
qˆα,t = Qα(θt), of explanatory variables, θt, that is the solution
to the following optimisation problem
argmin
Qα
[∑
t
max {(1 − α)(qˆα,t − yt), α(yt − qˆα,t)}
]
.
(23)
Here, gradient boosted machines are used to determine Qα for
α = 0.01, 0.05, ..., 0.95, 0.99, inspired by the winning entry
from the 2014 Global Energy Forecasting Competition using
the R package gbm [24], [25].
V. CASE STUDY
The performance of the proposed trading strategies is eval-
uated in a case study using historic data from the GB power
system in the UK. There are two coupled auctions operated by
APX and N2EX (Nordpool) which clear at the same price for
each hour of the next day. The balancing market comprises
half-hour settlement periods and is operated by the System
Operator (SO) and Elexon. Trading in the intraday market
can take place up until gate closure one hour before each
settlement period begins, though participation in this markets
is not considered here. Following the end of each settlement
period, the single balancing price is calculated based on
actions taken by the SO. This price is the volume-weighted
average of the most expensive 50MWh of balancing actions
taken relating to that period.
Electricity market data are available from Elexon [26], who
operate the data service for the GB balancing mechanism.
The data we utilise in this study are day-ahead and balancing
prices, plus day-ahead forecasts of load, national wind and
solar generation, and generation margin at peak demand. Half-
hour resolution wind power and day-ahead power forecasts for
five UK wind farm are provided by an anonymous GB wind
farm operator and aggregated, since imbalances are calculated
on an aggregate basis.
The period 06/11/2015 to 06/05/2016 is used in this case
study covering the first six months following the switch from a
dual- to single-price balancing mechanism. Due to the limited
volume of data, all analysis is performed on a hold-out basis
where a portion of the data are held-out and used for testing
while models are fit to the remaining data.
Offer strategies have been implemented with benchmarks
based on perfect and simple forecasts to demonstrate the
relative value and limitations of each method.
A. System Length Forecast and Evaluation
The performance of the probabilistic forecast of system
length is first evaluated in terms of the Brier score and its
decomposition. As a benchmark, the historic proportion of
occasion when each settlement period is short is used as a
forecast, using the hold-out sample method.
The Brier score is a proper scoring rule for probabilistic
forecasts of binary events and is given by
Brier Score =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(φi − oi)
2
(24)
TABLE I
BRIAR SCORES FOR PROBABILISTIC SYSTEM LENGTH FORECASTS. THE
UNCERTAINTY COMPONENT OF THE BRIER SCORE IS 0.2337 IN BOTH
CASES.
Method Brier Score Reliability Resolution
Empirical Proportions 0.2318 0.0001 0.0029
Logistic Regression 0.2265 0.0030 0.0102
where the observation oi = 1 if NIVi > 0, and 0 oth-
erwise [27]. The Brier score rewards both reliability and
confidence. The best score achievable is 0 if the either 0 or
1 is correctly forecast. Confident forecasts, i.e. those close to
0 or 1, are rewarded with a lower Brier score than cautions
perditions, i.e. close to 0.5, if they are correct, and more
heavily penalised if they are wrong side of 0.5.
The Brier score can be decomposed into reliability, reso-
lution and uncertainty [28]. Reliability is a measure of how
close the forecast probabilities are to the proportion of positive
outcomes, resolution is a measure of how much the forecast
probabilities vary from the climatic average, and uncertainty
measures the inherent uncertainty of the event being forecast.
Mathematically these are given by
Reliability =
1
N
K∑
k=1
nk(φk − o¯k)
2
, (25)
Resolution =
1
N
K∑
k=1
nk(o¯k − o¯)
2
, (26)
Uncertainty = o¯ (1− o¯) , (27)
where N is the total number of forecasts issued, K is the
number of unique forecasts issued, and nk is the total number
of times the kth unique forecast is issued. The terms o¯ and
o¯k are the mean outcome and the mean outcome conditional
on the kth unique forecast being issued, respectively. Here,
forecasts are grouped into 21 forecast bins centred on values
from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.05.
A separate model is fit for each settlement period. Forecasts
of load, wind generation, and generation margin at peak are
included as explanatory variables for all periods, while forecast
of solar generation are only used during hours of daylight,
specifically periods 12–41. Forecasts are produced out-of-
sample for each day of the dataset using models trained on the
all other data. The performance of this approach is tabulated in
Table I, along with the performance of the benchmark model.
The performance of binary forecasts such as these can also
be evaluated by examining their relative operating character-
istic (ROC) curves [29], [30]. ROC curves depict the trade-
off between true-positive and false-positive forecasts across
the full range of predicted probabilities. Loosely, a more
skilful forecast method is that with a higher true-positive and
lower false-negative rate than the competing method. ROC
curves for system length forecasts are presented in Figure 1,
which illustrates that forecasts produced by logistic regression
consistently outperform the benchmark.
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Fig. 1. Relative operator characteristic curves for system length forecasts.
The diagonal line, False Positive Rate = True Positive Rate illustrates the
performance of a random forecast, e.g. a random forecast of 70% would be
expected to correctly predict 70% of all positive outcomes, and falsely predict
that 70% of negative outcomes would be positive.
B. Price Forecast Evaluation
The exogenous variables available for price forecasting are
the same as those used in the logistic regression for system
length forecasting, namely day-ahead forecasts of load, wind,
solar, and generation margin. Data are grouped into three
day-types: weekdays, weekends, and holidays. It should be
noted that because the day-ahead market requires offers to
be submitted before 11am, balancing prices for times later
than this will not be available as input to the forecast of
balancing prices for the next day. For this reason, two-step-
ahead forecasts of balancing prices for periods after 10am are
used, to allow for delays in the 10:00–10:30 and 10:30–11:00
balancing prices becoming available.
Models of order (1,1) and (2,1) are most common and
account for over 25% of the models fit. Results are presented
in terms of the critical probability, Φ = pi
C−pi−
pi+−pi− , and evaluated
in terms of root mean square error (RMSE) and mean absolute
error (MSE). These are given by
RMSE =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
t,k
(
Φt+k − Φˆt+k|t
)2
(28)
and
MAE =
1
N
N∑
t,k
∣∣∣Φt+k − Φˆt+k|t∣∣∣ (29)
where Φˆt+k|t is the forecast of Φt+k made at time t, and N
is the total number of samples.
The mean value of day-ahead and balancing prices from
the same month and settlement period is used as a simple
TABLE II
NORMALISED REVENUE (£/MWH) USING DIFFERENT TRADING
STRATEGIES. FOR STRATEGIES MARKED ∗ ‘FORECAST METHOD’ REFERS
TO THE TYPE OF PRICE FORECAST ONLY. THE MEAN DAY-AHEAD PRICE
DURING THE TEST PERIOD WAS £34.80/MWH.
Strategy
Forecast Method
Perfect Simple Advanced
Minimise Imbalance 34.66 n/a 34.82
SL Forecast: Deterministic 49.99 33.21 34.34
SL Forecast: Empirical Proportion∗ 41.75 35.94 39.27
SL Forecast: Logistic∗ 41.39 36.91 39.00
benchmark to asses the quality of the ARMAX forecasts. The
MAE for the ARMAX and simple methods is 0.23 and 0.45,
respectively; and the RMSE is 0.43 and 0.56, respectively.
The ARMAX modelling approach clearly outperforms the
simple method in terms of both error metrics. Forecasts from
both methods will tested though implementation of the bidding
strategies described in Sections III-B–III-D in order to quantify
this improvement in monetary terms.
C. Offer Strategy Results
The revenue generated for the non-risk-constrained strate-
gies described in Sections III-A–III-C are calculated using
the half-hourly metered power from a portfolio of five UK
wind farms and the forecasts described above. These results
are tabulated in Table II along with results using perfect and
simple benchmark forecasts for comparison. Any additional
income from subsidies or other incentive schemes is not
included, neither are the costs associated with securing access
to the transmission system or electricity market membership.
These results indicate that strategies based on exploiting
favourable imbalance prices and a probabilistic forecast of
system length can generate more revenue than attempting
to minimise imbalance volumes. The strategy based on a
deterministic forecast of system length does not improve on
imbalance volume minimisation except in the case of perfect
foresight demonstrating the significance of imbalance price
asymmetry. All strategies perform best when coupled with
advanced rather than simple price forecasts. It is notable that
perfect power forecasting does not increase revenue in the
imbalance minimisation strategy.
The probabilistic forecast of system length based on logistic
regression generates more revenue than that based on empirical
proportions using simple price forecasts; however, the converse
is true when using the advanced price forecasts, despite the
logistic model having superior predictive performance.
Risk constrained strategies are evaluated in terms of rev-
enue, the average size of imbalances, and value at risk (VaRα).
The α% VaR is a threshold value such that the chance of the
revenue being below that threshold is α%. Here, it is calculated
as the α-percentile of the empirical distribution of settlement
period revenue. Mean absolute imbalance, given by
d˜ = mean
{
|ECt+k − Et+k|
}
, (30)
is also reported to compare the size of imbalance leveraged
by each strategy.
Revenue, VaR1%, and mean absolute imbalance are cal-
culated for the three risk-constrained strategies described in
7Additive Adjustment
ν Revenue VaR1% d˜
0 34.82 0.54 9%
0.5 37.89 2.16 35%
1 39.00 4.52 46%
Multiplicative Adjustment
η Revenue VaR1% d˜
0 34.82 0.54 9%
0.5 36.65 -0.02 21%
1 38.40 -0.00 38%
5 38.87 2.63 44%
10 38.95 3.95 45%
Quantile
α′ Revenue VaR1% d˜
0.55 34.93 0.40 10%
0.75 35.48 0.10 11%
0.95 36.62 0.11 20%
0.99 38.05 0.62 33%
Units: £/MWh £ % of Emax
TABLE III
PERFORMANCE OF THE RISK-CONSTRAINED OFFER STRATEGIES. THE
CASE ν, η = 0 IS EQUIVALENT TO OFFERING A VOLUME EQUAL TO THE
WIND POWER FORECAST (IMBALANCE MINIMISATION), THE ADDITIVE
ADJUSTMENT STRATEGY WITH ν = 1 IS EQUIVALENT TO OFFERING
ZERO/MAX.
Section III-D. The probabilistic forecast of system length from
the logistic model is used along with ARMAX forecasts of the
prices. Plots of these results are presented in Figures 2 and 3.
Key results are tabulated in Table III.
All strategies successfully reduce risk and increase revenue
when offer volume adjustments are small, but tend towards
the high-risk zero/max strategy for larger adjustments. This
change in behaviour occurs at the highest revenue for the
multiplicative strategy at the point where η = 1, where the
offer is either zero or 200% of expected generation. When
η > 1 increasingly extreme short positions are taken while
long positions are restricted since offers below zero are not
possible.
The additive and quantile strategies, on the other hand, are
able to take short positions regardless of expected generation
resulting in more frequent and extreme short positions, and
therefore, more frequent losses and higher VaR. Since wind
power generation is more likely to be close to zero than Emax,
the effect described above results in short positions being
taken more frequently than long positions. This increases VaR
since short positions can result in negative revenue, whereas
long positions can only result in reduced revenue, unless the
balancing price is negative.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Trading strategies for variable generation participating in
electricity markets with single-price balancing mechanisms
have been proposed and analysed. The problem is formulated
as a decision-making problem under uncertainty and solved
relying on a probabilistic forecast of system length, in the first
instance to maximise revenue, and in the second to constrain
risk. The trading strategies are based on simple analytics
using robust and accessible forecasting methods making them
adaptable and attractive to many players in the information-
rich smart grid paradigm.
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Fig. 2. Plot of revenue vs 1% VaR for the three risk-constrained strategies
with parameter values spanning those listed in Table III. Crosses indicate the
results from the revenue-maximising (zero/max) and imbalance minimising
strategies tabulated in Table II.
It is shown that by hedging against penalising imbalance
prices, market participants both reduce imbalance charges
and profit from increased exposure to favourable balancing
prices. In the most extreme example, revenue is increased
by over 10% before considering any subsidy, though this
requires the participant to leverage large imbalances that may
be considered unacceptable by risk-averse generators, and poor
practice by regulators. However, a more conservative risk-
constrained approach can increase revenue while simultane-
ously decreasing risk. While the problem is formulated with
the UK electricity market in mind, the principal of positioning
oneself favourably in any day-ahead market is applicable to
other problems where the cost of correcting that position is
reflected in a single price, be that a balancing price or some
intraday contract.
Future work should consider extending the problem for-
mulation to include probabilistic price forecasts in order to
develop strategies based on the risk associated with specific
settlement periods. Furthermore, the limits of the price-taker
assumption should be established, and the price-maker sce-
nario studied.
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